

Daryna Desenko

V. N. Karazin Kharkov National University, Ukraine

e-mail: darina.desenko@gmail.com

Media in the Processes of Inclusion and Exclusion – a Case Study on the Example of the „Great Ukrainians” Project

ABSTRAKT

Media w procesach inkluzji i ekskluzji społecznej – studium przypadku na przykładzie programu „Wielcy Ukraińcy”

Nadrzędnym celem artykułu jest przedstawienie roli dyskursów historycznych w procesach inkluzji i ekskluzji społecznej, stanowiących zobrazowanie symbolicznej walki na przykładach znanych osobistości. Istotę artykułu stanowi również chęć zaakcentowania faktu, iż współczesne narracje historyczne to przykłady interpretacji przeszłości mające na celu skonstruowanie pewnych opinii publicznych. Tezy te są oparte na analizie projektu medialnego „Wielcy Ukraińcy”. Za pomocą analizy dyskursu prezentującego podziały na „swoich” i „obcych” wykazano, że w tego typu narracjach historycznych brakuje krytycznej analizy wspomnień, które tenże dyskurs gromadzi. W ten sposób ogranicza się historię, narzucając jej rolę „upamiętnienia” przeszłości, która pomaga obywatelom odczuwać dumę ze swoich „przodków”, „bohaterów” i „wspaniałych”, a przez to umacnia ich narodową tożsamość.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: integracja, wykluczenie, system mass mediów, dyskurs historyczny, narracja historyczna.

Modern society can be characterized by a constant increase of speed and volume of information. The activity of the mass media has a great impact on the life of a society as a whole and on each individual, thus forming certain opinions, moods, and emotions. Moreover, it can be observed that there is a kind of transformation of the structures of socialization: first, in the socialization of the individuals, where the mass media play an increasing role, and secondly, the media themselves increasingly appeal to visualization, signs, simulacra in the supply of information. Specialists in this industry are perfectly aware that the corresponding information delivery is perceived as simplified and, as such, it takes

less time to absorb and assimilate it. A by-product of this visibility is an uncritical and superficial attitude of individuals to the information offered. Classical structures, institutions of the state and society, are affected by the system of mass media. There is an actualization of various identities, formation of various stereotypes of perception where individuals, by means of mass media, are included in or excluded from various practices, ideologies and discourses.

The ubiquitous spread of mass media has had an impact on such a field of human knowledge as history. Contrary to somewhat pessimistic forecasts of Adorno and Horkheimer and their „Dialectic of Enlightenment“¹, the emergence of radio and television (and now the Internet) has not led to a homogenization of a society and to the formation of units of different ideas concerning universal history, that would be imposed through the capillary control over citizens. Instead, in the globalizing world of the 21st century, there is a significant number of historical discourses which declare themselves, enter into a dialogue, and often contradict one another. Gianni Vattimo explains that the world of mass media, albeit being a planetary world is at the same time a world where centres are capable of collecting and transmitting information, becoming more numerous, and none of them can claim to be the main uniting and coordinating one². Thus the media system offers a modern history of an individual neither in the classic Hegelian sense nor where multiple historical discourses, reflecting the symbolic struggle of the global world, can be found:

„The great game of history is won by the one who takes possession of the rules, who will take the place of those who use these rules, who will wear a mask and be able to distort them, use them contrary to their logic and turn against those who have imposed these rules; who, having penetrated into a complex machine will make it function in such a way that the ruling will be subordinate to their own rules“³.

Inclusion/exclusion in the proposed media presentations occurs non-reflexively, but it generates spaces of conflict, a struggle for the recognition of the „true“ discourse.

The ontological aspect of the problem situation is that the historical discourse serves the media systems in the form of (self)evident narration, without disclosing the fact that this narrative is only one of the interpretations of the past. Historical discussions, for example, regarding the crisis of the seventeenth century, are not debates about the actual past, but about narrative interpretations of the past. Thus, contradictory discourses often become the basis for conflict situations and divisions into „us“ and „others“. The choice of a particular historical narrative by an individual marks it and includes/excludes it in a certain community. In practice,

¹ M. Horkhajmer, *Dialektika Prosveshheniya. Filosofskie fragmenty*, Sankt-Peterburg 1997.

² Dzh. Vattimo., *Prozrachnoe obshchestvo*, Moskva 2002.

³ M. Fuko, Nicshe, *Genealogiya i istoriya*, „Filosofiya epoxipostmoderna“, 1996, p. 74-97.

this symbolic division can lead to both conflicts in the network and to civil clashes, which are very common in the era of „separatism”.

The epistemological aspect of this work is that inclusion/exclusion in the social sciences is usually reduced only to direct methods of including vulnerable (discriminated) sections of the population, while inclusion/exclusion tools are present throughout modern discourses, implicitly producing categories and differences. The system of mass media (re)produces the processes of inclusion/exclusion through historical narratives, but also when (symbolic) boundaries are included in the narrative of significant historical figures. With the help of such actions discourse is presented as more attractive for a certain group. The logic of the historical narrative, as we define it in this article, is strictly nominalistic and dictates the consumer how he or she should think and who or what should be forgotten.

The goal of the article is, therefore, to reveal how historical discourses are involved in inclusion/exclusion processes of personalities, (re)installing borders in a symbolic struggle.

Even at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, philosophical thought criticized the idea of a single history, exposing the ideological nature of these ideas. For example, Walter Benjamin wrote, that history as a kind of unidirectional and unified movement is such a representation of the past that was generated by socially dominant groups and classes⁴. And despite the fact that the meta-narrative has collapsed, giving birth to the multi-voiced cacophony of various points of view, behind certain historical narratives there is a certain correlation of forces.

Continuing previous developments, we intend to consider the inclusion/exclusion as a non-flexible (de)actualization of one of the sets of identities, stereotypes, ideologies, myths, practices with the purpose of producing (not-)attention, and, accordingly, inspiring a certain behaviour⁵. In this case, we consider how the mass media system participates in the inclusion/exclusion processes by manipulating historical narratives.

As a historical narrative, following F. R. Ankersmit, within the framework of this work, we understand interpretation of the past. These interpretations have the nature of suggestions to look at the past from a certain point of view. Interpretations are not limited since an infinite number of interpretations can explain all known data⁶.

⁴ V. Benyamin, *Proizvedenie iskusstva v epoxu ego texnicheskoj vosproizvodimosti*, Moskva 1996.

⁵ D. S. Desenko, «Vklyuchenie/isklyuchenie» v sovremennom mire: osnovnye interpretacii i tendencii razvitiya, „Sociologicheskie issledovaniya sovremennogo obshchestva: metodologiya, teoriya, metody”, 2016, № 37, p. 100 – 108.

⁶ F. R. Ankersmit, *Istoriya i tropologiya: vzlet i padenie metafory*, Moskva 2003.

Historical discourse, in this sense, can be understood as a broader phenomenon, that may include a large number of historical narratives that do not contradict each other in their foundations. Historical discourse is constituted and (re)produced within a certain image of the world. Faced with one another, historical discourses create a whole space of conflicts between their supporters, who believe their picture of the world to be more reliable, correct, and often the only possible one. At that time, all interpretations are based on historical facts and events, but the form of their presentation constitutes a „poetic act” on the part of the historian. „Historians are social agents, whose works are the products of a meeting of social habitus formed to a certain extent by the historical field as a system of requirements and censorship: it is what is, as a historical field, which is”⁷. The choice between competing discourses in an attempt to reflect on history is based on esthetics and ethical prerequisites, rather than on epistemological evidence⁸.

An additional complexity in the (re)production of historical narratives is made by the mass media systems. If in the 19th century „the consumers of history” were a satisfied narrow academic and intellectual stratum, then, in the modern world, history has been popularized for wide strata of the population. However, this popularization has affected the quality of the information that is in demand. An average individual is not interested in fundamental historical books, which offer the most complete and wide range of interpretations but are satisfied with existing media representations. In this way, the selection and accents in the presented media historical narratives are completely dependent on the system of the mass media.

The selectivity of the mass media was described by, among others, such well-known sociologists, as P. Bourdieu, N. Luhmann, and J. Habermas. Synthesizing their views in the consideration of the mass media as a system, we can come to the conclusion that every system is characterized by a structure that is determined by the composition of elements and functional relationships. N. Luhmann’s structural junction of the three components of the mass media systems (news/messages, advertising, entertainment) with such systems of society as politics, economics, art⁹, does not seem relevant in the modern globalizing world. There is a „blur” of internal borders in the mass media systems. So, advertising, that seeks to colonize the life world of the individual¹⁰, is presented today in the field of entertainment („unobtrusive” advertising in films), news, and even in everyday communication of the agent („contextual” advertising on the Internet). Political intentions influence the nature and direction of

⁷ P. Bourdieu, *O gosudarstve*, Moskva 2016.

⁸ X. Uajt, *Metaistoriya: Istoricheskoe voobrazhenie v Evrope XIX v.*, Ekaterinburg 2002.

⁹ N. Luman, *Realnost massmedia*, Moskva 2005.

¹⁰ Yu. Habermas, *Vovlechenie drugogo. Ocherkipoliticheskoy teorii*, Sankt-Peterburg 2001.

entertainment content, and the economy often participates in the production of media discourse.

Mass media can choose or reject a particular topic, based on self-referential joining operations of the system to each other. So, the topic can be rejected, if we assume that it is not interesting to readers or listeners. In other words, when it is not functional for the mass media. This fact of avoidance means that the system has its own way of encoding information, and not just the ability to respond to events in the surrounding world.

In the mass media system, there is a binary code of „information/non-information”. Only if something is designated as information, it is possible to begin operations of the mass media system. But to denote something as information, it is necessary to be able to designate something else as non-information. Historical information is subjected to the same selection, as only a subjectively significant part of it is included in the media message. And an interpretation of a historical event usually happens *ad hoc*, due to the historical perspective and view of the world, which is characterized by reproduced interpretations¹¹.

The choice concerning the presentation of certain events that will or will not be covered seems to be an important piece of information that the viewer should have an access to, yet she or he is not given such an opportunity¹². Such framing is selective and can deny the existence of anything which is outside the framework. Without saying anything, the mass media certainly recognize the objectively existing order. „Extensible to infinity, the event is easily or with some difficulties linked to the whole subsequent chain of events, with the preceding facts and seems to us inseparable from them”¹³. Thus, the user is offered certain (self)obvious assignments, and not the whole range of possible interpretations.

Here, on the other hand, one can appeal to the fact that the mass media system has a certain intensity of loading, and despite the multichannel information, it is queued for a limited time (in other words, it loses its relevance and is, as a result, removed from the queue). The order of information is determined, according to P. Bourdieu, by fast-thinkers, who (conditionally) prioritize particular news, depending on the perceived benefit. But this can explain the selectivity of newspapers and television, whose output stream is limited by the time of the broadcast or the volume of the publication. However, with the advent of the Internet media, which are much less limited in time and material resources, the selectivity of coverage of some events with almost complete disregard for others raises the issue of mass media systems' bias, not

¹¹ P. Bourdieu, *O gosudarstve*, op. cit.

¹² P. Bourdieu, *O televidenii i zhurnalistike*, Moskva 2002.

¹³ F. Brodel, *Istoriya i obshchestvennyye nauki. Istoricheskaya dlitelnost*, „Filosofiya i Metodologiya Istorii”, 2000, p. 115-142.

only engaging in the market logic or the logic of physical capacity, but also with the Bourdieu's „common sense” as a repository of „impracticable” and „obvious by virtue of unintelligibility”¹⁴.

There is direct communication between media messages and the public importance of the issues, that is, the audience's presentation of the importance of certain problems. Thus, this is the formation of the fact that P. Bourdieu called a „public opinion”. There is in some sense a censored definition of public opinion as an enlightened opinion, that is, an opinion worthy of naming, while:

„it is that sensation on any subject that is shared by the most knowledgeable, intelligent and moral people in the community, the feeling that they have. This view is gradually spreading and adopted in a civilized state by all people with a certain level of education and suitable feelings”¹⁵.

It means that through the system of mass media, the truth of the rulers becomes the truth of all. The same is true for historical narratives as behind each there are certain political interests in question.

Clash of political interests in their symbolic struggle can be considered on the example of the media project „Great Ukrainians” (2008-2009)¹⁶, pretending to serve a historic and educational function. The project of the Ukrainian television channel „Inter”, combined a talk show with an interactive survey of Ukrainian citizens regarding the place and role of outstanding state and political figures, servicemen, artists, scientists, athletes, religious figures in the national history of the country. The format of the created talk show was borrowed from the BBC, where it was known under the original title – „Great Britons”.

The choice of a case from a decade ago, on one hand, is mediated by the fact that it is alienated by a certain period of time from the modern realities, which makes it possible to look at the problems raised more neutrally and in a detached way. On the other hand, knowing the information about subsequent events in the country, there is a danger of interpreting these materials *ad hoc*, through the prism of (pre)given knowledge. Within the framework of the present contribution, a discourse analysis was carried out within this project as an example of how historical discourses participate in the inclusion/exclusion of personalities, thereby (re)setting boundaries in a symbolic struggle. The unit of analysis is a statement, but the discourses are historical in nature and can only be viewed in context. Society and culture are dialectically associated with discourse – they are formed by discourse and at the same time, they are constituting discourse. Each separate utterance (re)produces and transforms society and culture, including relations of power¹⁷.

¹⁴ P. Bourdieu, *O televidenii i zhurnalistike*, op. cit.

¹⁵ P. Bourdieu, *O gosudarstve*, op. cit.

¹⁶ *Veliki Ukraïnci – sto velikix Ukraïnciv*, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eAOdXV1a1s> (05.05.2018).

¹⁷ S. Ticher, *Metody analiza teksta i diskursa*, Harkov 2009.

When creating the project „Great Ukrainians”, it was positioned that the audience was selected according to a special sociological sample representing the entire population of Ukraine, having the right to vote during a talk show. Counting of votes both in the studio and during the „popular vote” was provided by the expert company GFK. It is worth noting that the GFK Group specializes mainly in marketing research, which may mean that the choice of the company implied the project to be primarily market-oriented, namely the request of the historical figures that will sell the best in the area was of importance. Not to mention the fact that this project is a hybrid combination of sociological sampling and „popular vote” with the use of mobile's phones which can't claim to be representative, as it has all the disadvantages of online-surveys¹⁸. In addition, for participation in voting, at least a small fee was charged (the cost of a text message is 1 UAH, that is approximately 0,13 euro). For most European countries, such a fee was considered insignificant and had virtually no effect on the sample, whereas in Ukraine, people with low incomes, mostly did not participate in the paid shares.

In addition, in the studio, there were members of the „Council of Guarantors”, which was formed of representatives of the academic community, as well as „lords of the most influential denominations”¹⁹. As a result, the „Council of Guarantors” included: L. Kravchuk, L. Lukyanenko, M. Popovich, V. Lytvyn, I. Deryugina, D. Korchinsky, P. Simonenko, T. Chernovol, D. Tabachnik, Y. Rybchinsky, with some minor changes in the final issue in the expert community concerning S. Vakarchuk, B. Stupka and others. Without challenging the social significance of these figures, we note that the issue of including these experts was not discussed on the air. This is exactly the pre-assignment offered by the mass media system, which is not specified. And here we see the embodiment of the logic of the commissions of P. Bourdieu: „In order to create a group formed in such a way that it demonstrates all external, socially recognized and recognized, official signs of the ability to express an opinion worthy of expression, and in the forms that correspond to it”²⁰. It is also worth mentioning the opportunistic conditionality of these commissions, after all, after 2014, Dmitry Tabachnyk would have hardly been delegated the authority to represent Ukraine's public opinion, and Viktor Yanukovich would no longer be ranked 62nd among the „Great Ukrainians”.

The claim of disinterestedness and disengagement was a statement by the show hosts on the refusal to discuss the current politicians such as V. Yushchenko, Y. Timoshenko, V. Yanukovich in the program, emphasizing the non-political

¹⁸ M. Savage, R. Burrows, *After the crisis? Big Data and the methodological challenges of empirical sociology*, <http://bds.sagepub.com/content/1/1/2053951714540280.full> (05.05.2018).

¹⁹ Peremozhchi proektu „Veliki Ukraïnci”: Yaroslav Mudrij, Mikola Amosov ta Stepan Bandera, <https://eukraina.com/news/2008-05-17-2864> (05.05.2018).

²⁰ P. Bourdieu, *O gosudarstve*, op. cit.

nature of the program and repeatedly saying that the main purpose of the talk show is „cognitive”. Nevertheless, political connotations were largely present in the project, both in the form of political debates around the eligibility of inclusion/exclusion of historical figures in the list and in the form of discussion and making a subjective assessment of historical events.

The role of the „Council of Guarantors” in the analyzed case, specifically, the role of legitimators and explainers, providing rationale on why this or that historical figure enters the list should also be noted as significant. So, in relation to the Soviet realities that are not too „comfortable” for the construction of the Ukrainian identity, the theses of the following type were expressed: „You cannot refuse so fast” (V. Lytvyn), „In the head of the citizens what was in the textbooks” (L. Lukyanenko), „Voted for youth” (T. Chernovol). Through such comments the Commission explicitly and implicitly expressed both resentment and approval of „popular vote”, in this way, creating socially acceptable opinion. The inclusion in the „Great Ukrainians” list of such figures as L. I. Brezhnev, N. S. Khrushchev, A. G. Stakhanov exposed at least a soft, but still a critic, as a relic of the past, which is still difficult to let go and characterizes the quotes above. L. Kurbas of the „expert circle”, on the other hand, dramatized and openly expressed support and approval of the fact, that list included the repressed people in the USSR. Thus, by incorporating something phrases like „worthy opinion” and excluding views like „inertia” and „propaganda results”, the constitution of the public opinion was carried out.

In the final hundred of the „Great Ukrainians” list, there are 22 contemporary figures, and the greater part of the other names belong to the twentieth century period, which can speak of both, poor awareness of the historical personalities of Ukrainians and of a significant shift in the perception of Ukrainian history to the actual modernity. During the talk show, V. Lytvyn noted: „A significant number of voters focused on the new period, and were less aware of those pre-forgotten names, unrecognized...”. Despite the fact, that textbooks offer camping to count the history of Ukraine from Tripoli culture, „Ukraine” as a unique historical project is a much more recent formation. Each nation, proclaiming its identity, seeks, through historical narratives, to justify its prescription. „There is nothing particularly surprising in that the newly independent states, having borrowed much from their colonial predecessors, inherited this form of political museumization”²¹. This is a certain symbolic struggle for the right to put the starting point as far as possible on a time scale, essentially imaginary and very conditional, but nevertheless able to make the identity more attractive.

In addition, the project „Great Ukrainians” is characterized by gender bias in

²¹ B. Anderson, *Voobrazhaemye soobshhestva. Razmyshleniya ob istokax i rasprostraneniі nacionalizma*, Moskva 2016.

both the „expert circle” and in the final hundred: only 15 of the selected great Ukrainians are women. This is due to the insignificant historical role of women in past centuries, as well as the preserved patriarchal stereotypes of local culture.

The issue of selection of „great” and „Ukrainians” in general is quite broad and controversial itself. It is, therefore, worth posing the question concerning the choice of the criteria of historical figures that were included or excluded from the „Great Ukrainians” list.

Let us start with the end, namely with the criteria for the definition of „Ukrainians”. Many people, who were included in the final hundred, have caused a heated debate in the „Council of Guarantors”. In other words, as far back as 2008, that discursive split was seen, which got its physical embodiment in 2013 – 2014.

If the criterion for determining the person as a Ukrainian is based on the mere fact of being born on the territory of Ukraine, then this characteristic is not stable over time.

As theorists say in this regard, „through chronologically ordered sequences of cards, a kind of the politically-biographical narrative of the dynastic state”. However, the very name of the territory changed over time, not to mention the periods, when parts of present-day Ukraine were fragments of other empires. So, for example, Saint Olga, presumably, born in Kievan Rus, is considered the ruler of the ancient Russian state and stands at the beginning of the Rurik dynasty. Ilya Yefimovich Repin was born in the Russian Empire and it’s creative formation took place in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Therefore, this historical figure entered both the list of „Great Ukrainians” and „Name Russia”²² – a similar Russian project of the same year. Similarly, controversial figures were M. Bulgakov, N. Gogol, Yaroslav the Wise, V. Lenin and others.

If the criterion was the definition of a Ukrainian in regard to the linguistic aspect, then around half of the list should have been rejected. Starting with the fact that with the name „Ukraine” was first met in the annals in 1187, that is, much later, than the lives of Svyatoslav Igorevich, Yaroslav the Wise, and Vladimir Monomakh. Even the constitution of Pylyp Orlyk, also included in the list, was written in Latin. And ending with the fact, that the A. S. Makarenko, V. A. Sukhomlinsky, V. I. Vernadsky, N. V. Gogol and M. A. Bulgakov created their greatest works, which determined their contribution to the world history, in Russian.

A possible selection criterion was a significant contribution of a person to the development of Ukraine. In this section, the figures of N. S. Khrushchev and L. I. Brezhnev gave rise to a host of controversial discussions among the „expert circle”. So, for example, Y. Rybchinsky expressed himself by saying: „There can be

²² *Imya Rossiya. Istoricheskij vybor 2008*, <http://top50.nameofrussia.ru> (05.05.2018).

no Khrushchev, there can be no Brezhnev! Why is he here? Because he lived here? What did he do for Ukraine? Fought with dissidents? With the Ukrainian language?”. Through this statement, we can observe how in undesirable cases even birth on the territory of Ukraine is not unconditional and sufficient, and the argument goes by other criteria just to exclude such an undesirable relationship. A counterargument provided by D. Tabachnyk is as follows:

„People remember these millions of Ukrainians who lived in the village and whom Khrushchev gave passports. And millions have returned from the camps. And Brezhnev rebuilt the plants of Zaporozhye and Dnipropetrovsk. For the first time bridges have been restored, and people remember how they began to live better”.

The above discussion characterizes the symbolic struggle of opposing discourses with respect to memory policies. Each historical narrative offers not only „what?” to remember, but „how?” to remember it. Discrimination occurs through a language protocol that suggests choosing a particular side.

„Collective memory, social memory or memory is individual – and makes us with you what we are, building our identity and defining our belonging to a certain community – groups, communities, cities, nations, countries”²³.

There is an inclusion in a certain mode of memory, which mediates the choice of what is significant, what must be remembered, and what needs to be forgotten.

Then, perhaps, the criterion for determining a person as a Ukrainian is his (self)identification? Here, the already mentioned Mikhail Bulgakov, who, according to the talk show director S. Shuster: „denied the Ukrainian statehood”, appears to be a controversial figure, and, as Yu. Rybchinsky noted: „he did not rebalance himself with the Ukrainian”. It is already possible to trace the pattern that all controversial historical figures cause vigorous debate over the right to include or exclude them from its historical past. Argumentation against can be built, for example, on the belittling of the cultural contribution of the individual: „The fact that many people voted for Bulgakov shows their bad literary taste ... he was just a journalist, not a writer” (D. Korchinsky). The fact that M. Bulgakov has a neglected Ukrainian identity weakens the national historical narrative, accordingly, one possible defence strategy is the reduction and depreciation of this opinion.

What can be, therefore, observed is that there was no single criterion for determining the „Ukrainians”, but on the other hand, there were no restrictions concerning such a choice in the show, contrary to other countries. In a similar project in Germany, a „blacklist” was introduced thanks to which Adolf Hitler and many other supporters of the Third Reich were excluded from the vote. In such

²³ P. Konnerton, *Yak suspilstva pam'yatayut*, Kiev 2004.

a political decision, there is a clear desire to distance ourselves as much as possible, to eliminate the stigmatized past from our history. In the project „Name Russia”, the number of nominees did not include living people, and yet the original sample consisted of 500 names. In the final issue, the results for Ukraine were compared with France, Germany and Great Britain, but, curiously, there was no comparison with Russia. According to our hypothesis, this is due to a certain number of controversial historical figures, regardless of the criteria used and regardless of sharing the historical past, that both countries can claim as theirs.

The question of naming someone „great” is even more subjective; the participants of the talk show repeatedly asked about it and manipulated this aspect. Axes measuring greatness can be endless, and in cases which are positively correlated with popular historical discourse, the greatness of proof can be found in the victories, and the lesions. So, for example, when pointing out that many of the Ukrainian patriots and dissidents were not the winners, but the great martyrs were, D. Korchinsky notes that the modern world can be referred to as: „toilets of the defeats”. At that time, as for legitimizing the exclusion of the figure, argumentation challenging his or her greatness was used.

One way to determine what can be treated as „great” is to move along the path of exclusion, that is determining what is not „great”. For example: „cannot be considered great those who shed blood”- this thesis was put forward by D. Tabachnyk in an attempt to exclude L. I. Brezhnev and N. S. Khrushchev from the list of „great”. However, not only the secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee shed blood. This applies to all Ukrainian hetmans, and to the members of the OUN-UPA, and even, in particular, to Roksolana: „Because of her intrigue, the first son of Suleiman was killed. For the sake of the chosen successor, she destroyed her own child”. In this case, „spilt blood” is just an element of legitimization and symbolic struggle. Unsuitable historical figures were excluded on the basis of such arguments, while in other cases the issue of spilt blood was not problematized.

There was even a thesis that: „Great people are those who are beyond the good and the evil” (D. Korchinskiy). Yet this philosophical question is fundamentally subjective and indecisive, and such reasoning is aimed at including in the historical narrative such controversial figures that are designed to reproduce and enhance the memory of certain groups in one country, whereas for others, remain criminals and terrorists. An example of such a scandalous figure is Stepan Bandera, who finished third and took 16% of the votes, while the Parliament adopted a law banning the propaganda of the so-called

„Bandera ideology”²⁴. The adopted law concerns the definition of the crimes of the Ukrainian nationalists and Ukrainian organizations cooperating with the Third Reich, as well as the possibility of launching, in accordance with Art. 55 of the Law on the Institute of National Memory, criminal proceedings against people who deny these crimes²⁵. And, despite this fact, „expert circle” expressed claims that „in adopting our nationality we reach the absurd” (T. Chornovil). What is worth noting is that such claims concerned mostly the Soviet figures, as examples of some remnants of the past.

In general, the survey results are largely consistent with the hypothesis expressed by D. Tabachnik, that this list is a „photocopy of political activity of Ukraine”. Western Ukraine has established itself as a more politically active, and the top twenty „Great Ukrainians” included such figures as A. Sheptitsky, R. Shukhevich and S. Bandera. The presence on the same list of such Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of Socialist Labor as Alexei Stakhanov and Ivan Kozhedub shows us polarization of the discourses. When some historical narratives are aimed at constituting a national identity, others are clearly appealing to the Soviet past. This disagreement happened in the „expert column”, when T. Chernovol, Y. Rybchinsky, L. Lukyanenko and D. Korchinsky acted as „prophets” of the national narrative:

„A prophet is one who says instead of a group what a group cannot or does not want to say, and one who issues a mandate to himself, as it does not create a scandal by the very fact of saying things that until now the group did not or could not say”²⁶.

An opposite discourse was presented by P. Simonenko and D. Tabachnik. It should be noted that even a purely quantitative „distribution of forces” in the expert group suggests a tendency to shift public opinion and their media representatives to nationalist ideas.

The inclusion some of members of the OUN-UPA into the twenty caused a stormy reaction. On the one hand, this is the approval of the agents of nationalist narratives and wide interpretations of this as an increase in patriotic citizens. On the other hand, the reaction of the left wing took the following form: „Never brought up on traitors! And never traitors will not be Heroes of Ukraine! Sheptitsky and Shukhevych are traitors of the Ukrainian people” (P. Symonenko). So the figure of S. Bandera for the right-wing discourse is represented by the „flag”, and for the left one by the words „fascist” and „traitor”. And despite the utopian idea proposed by V. Lytvyn that: „this memory has become the only and collective value”, L. Lukyanenko proposed: „to answer the question: are you on

²⁴ *Bandera pod zapretom. Kakoj zakon prinyali v Polshe*, <https://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3934556-bandera-pod-zapretom-kakoi-zakon-prynialy-v-polshe> (5.05.2018).

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ P. Bourdieu, *O gosudarstve*, op. cit., p. 149.

the side of independent Ukraine or of a great Russian empire?”, which puts an original point in the discussion around the members of the OUN-UPA. From the point of view of discourse analysis, the above thesis is a rhetorical question of including/excluding „us” and „others”. In more primitive forms it is a division into „pure” and „dirty”, where the stained person is subjected to ostracism and exclusion.

In general, the discursive elements of the analyzed talk show confirm the interpretative nature of historical narratives. For example, in regard to Saint Olga, the historical fact is the extermination of the Drevlyans. The historical narrative deals with the interpretations of this event, as a „revenge for her husband” or „in fact, Olga destroyed her competitors” and the use of such expressions as „in fact” seems to be an element pointing to data contention of historical narratives.

Summing up the results of the study, we can conclude that the historical narratives are interpretations of certain events. They refer to and rely on historical facts, but are objective or true in the classical sense. The historical narrative represents a certain point of view, which participates in the constitution of the public opinion. „Affirmative historiography subordinates the past to those projects by which people are engaged in the present”²⁷. Such historical narratives lack a critical position in relation to those memories, which they collect, and to tradition, which they support. The narrative is not only apologetical to selected memories and traditions but actually leads to their mythologization. Such narratives reduce history to commemoration in order to give an opportunity for people to be proud of their „ancestors”, „characters”, „great”, and so on.

In historical discourses, there is a symbolic struggle for the right to name someone „our” or „their”, that is, to include/exclude certain personalities in or from the historical narrative.

The motivation for inclusion is the need to design a more attractive historical narrative, the ability to put the point of origin of a nation as early as possible. What, in fact, happened in the „Great Ukrainians” project, in which the first place on the list was occupied by Yaroslav the Wise, represented the claim of Ukrainians for: „an inseparable Ukrainian history for thousands of years” (D. Tabachnyk). A counterargument that will put this historical narrative into question („he was a Russian”, „we have eroded the notion of the nation”) aptly reduces a camping appeal to absolute values according to the type of justice and democracy: „He is a Ukrainian prince because the Ukrainian people so decided” (S. Vakarchuk). In the cases of exclusion, „popular vote” no longer serves as an excuse, but, on the contrary, there is a search for reasons for explaining and labelling such elections as deviant ones. In addition, this case illustrates that inclusion/exclusion

²⁷ A. Megill, *Istoriya i pamyat: za i protiv*, <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/istoriya-i-pamyat-za-i-protiv> (5.05.2018).

can be directed not only at individuals or social groups but also at certain linguistic structures – myths, which are capable, in cases of successful legitimation, of increasing the symbolic weight of discourse in the field.

Such tactics of inclusion/exclusion are characteristic of historical narratives, no matter what ideological platform they constitute. But it is possible to hypothesize, that different countries have different politics of memory. Thus, in Germany, forcedly, such stigmatized historical figures that are negatively perceived by the world community are excluded from the choice. Russia, in turn, abandoned the idea of a „blacklist” and, as a result, Joseph Stalin entered the final set. For a young country, that only recently received independence, the inclusion of controversial and ambivalent figures on the list is very characteristic. The symbolic struggle is mainly unfolding over the inclusion/exclusion of such personalities in its historical narrative.

Bibliography

- Anderson B., *Vobrazhaemye soobshhestva. Razmyshleniya obistokax i rasprostraneni nacionalizma*, Moskva 2016.
- Ankersmit F. R., *Istoriya i tropologiya: vzlet i padenie metafory*, Moskva 2003.
- Benjamin V., *Proizvedenie iskusstva v epoxu ego texnicheskajvo sproizvodimosti*, Moskva 1996.
- Brodel F., *Istoriya i obshhestvennye nauki. Istoricheskaya dlitelnost*, „Filosofiya i metodologiya istorii”, 2000, s. 115-142.
- Bourdieu P., *O televidenii i zhurnalistike*, Moskva 2002.
- Bourdieu P., *O gosudarstve*, Moskva 2016.
- Desenko D. S., „Vkllyuchenie/isklyuchenie” v sovremennom mire: osnovnye interpretacii i tendencii razvitiya, „Sociologicheskie issledovaniya sovremennogo obshhestva: metodologiya, teoriya, metody”, 2016, №37.
- Fuko M., Nicshe, *Genealogiya i istoriya*, „Filosofiya epoki postmoderna”, 1996, s.74-97.
- Horkxajmer M., *Dialektika Prosveshheniya. Filosofskie fragmenty*, Sankt-Peterburg 1997.
- Konnerton P., *Yak suspilstva pam'yatayut*, Kiev 2004.
- Luman N., *Realnost massmedia*, Moskva 2005.
- Ticher S., *Metody analiza teksta i diskursa*, Xarkov 2009.
- Uajt X., *Metaistoriya: Istoricheskoevo obrazhenie v Evrope XIX v.*, Ekaterinburg 2002.
- „Sociologicheskie issledovaniya sovremennogo obshhestva: metodologiya, teoriya, metody”, 2016, №37, s. 100–108.
- Vattimo Dzh., *Prozrachnoe obshhestvo*, Moskva 2002.
- Xabermas Yu., *Vovlechenie drugogo. Ocherkipoliticheskoy teorii*, Sankt-Peterburg 2001.

Online references

- Bandera pod zapretom. Kakoj zakon prinyali v Polshe*, <https://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3934556-bandera-pod-zapretom-kakoi-zakon-prynialy-v-polshe> (5.05.2018).
- Megill A., *Istoriya i pamyat: za i protiv*, <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/istoriya-i-pamyat-za-i-protiv> (5.05.2018).
- Peremozhciproektu „Veliki Ukrainci”: Yaroslav Mudrij, Mikola Amosov ta Stepan Bandera*,

<https://eukraina.com/news/2008-05-17-2864> (5.05.2018).

Rossiya I., *Istoricheskij vybor 2008*, <http://top50.nameofrussia.ru> (5.05.2018).

Savage M., R. Burrows, *After the crisis? Big Data and the methodological challenges of empirical sociology*, <http://bds.sagepub.com/content/1/1/2053951714540280.full> (5.05.2018).

Veliki Ukraïnci-stovelikix ukraïnciv, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ehAOdXVIa1s> (5.05.2018).

Media in the Processes of Inclusion and Exclusion – a Case Study on the Example of „Great Ukrainians” Project

Summary

The main aim of the article is to present how historical discourses are involved in the processes of inclusion/exclusion of certain personalities, thereby reinstating the boundaries in the symbolic struggle. It can be, therefore, stated that modern historical narratives are interpretations of the past aimed at constructing a certain public opinion. These hypotheses are examined on the example of the media project „Great Ukrainians”. With the help of discourse analysis of media presentations, an analysis is conducted with the aim of determining the characteristic of a symbolic struggle for the right to name someone „our” or „their” in historical narratives. In such historical narratives, there is no critical position in relation to the memories that they collect. They reduce history to a commemoration of the past to enable people to be proud of their „ancestors”, „heroes”, „greats”, and thereby to strengthen their national identity.

Keywords: inclusion, exclusion, mass media system, historical discourse, historical narrative.